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Abstract: This study aims to examine whether or not board characteristics have an impact on the 
quality of intellectual capital disclosures. A measure of the quality of intellectual capital disclosure 
(ICDQ) based on a content analysis of the text in annual reports of sample companies is incorporated 
in the model to examine its interaction with various board mechanisms. The results reveal that board 
independence, audit committee independence, and board gender diversity are non-significant in 
predicting ICDQ. However, board size, board nationality diversity and firm size were found to be 
relevant contributors to the variation in ICDQ. Their interaction with ICDQ considerably increases 
the explanatory power of the model. From the findings, a case is made for the nationality 
diversification of board members (directors) and the maintenance of manageable board sizes. This 
study provides first-time evidence of the interaction of board mechanisms and ICDQ in Nigeria. 
Keywords: Intellectual Property; Corporate Governance; Annual Reports; Voluntary Disclosure.  
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1 Introduction  
The concept of Intellectual capital (IC) gained grounds in the 1990s with the rapid 
emergence of information and communication technologies. It is simply the 
knowledge, organizational technology, professional skills, and customer relations 
that offer a competitive advantage in the market. According to Bontis (1998), the 
concept was first introduced by Kenneth Galbraith in 1969, who believed that 
intellectual capital was more than pure intellect but ‘intellectual action’.  It is the 
move from “having” knowledge to “using” the knowledge. 
As the dynamics of the Nigerian economy is making a shift away from its 
traditional product based economy to a knowledge based orientation and 
diversification approach, the importance of intellectual capital is beginning to gain 
momentum. The knowledge based economy is now increasingly important to value 
creation than ever before. By implication, a business’ invisible assets such as skills, 
learning and knowledge have now posed key strategic issues. In fact, companies, 
investors and analysts are beginning to demand for more reliable information on 
expertise, experience, managerial qualities, customer relations, and so forth- all 
variables of intellectual capital. According to Busacca and Maccarone (2007), the 
chief aim of financial reporting is to provide users of information with the actual 
structure of the company’s assets particularly its value creation assets. In the 
knowledge driven economy where intangible assets such as intellectual resources 
are held more crucial and essential for firm valuation than tangible asset in the 
                                                     
1 Doctoral student, Nasarawa State University, Department of accounting, Nigeria, 
oba156@yahoo.com  
2 Accountant, Accounts Department, Oil and Industrial Services Port Harcourt, Nigeria, 
accountability4real@yahoo.com   
3 Senior Lecturer, Department Of Accounting, University of Abuja, Nigeria, 
ymdamagum@yahoo.com  
J o u r n a l  o f  A c c o u n t i n g  a n d  M a n a g e m e n t                      J A M  v o l .  3 ,  n o .  1 ( 2 0 1 3 )  
 
66 
 
global market, non-disclosure of such assets will create information asymmetry 
(Guthrie and Petty, 2000). 
Intellectual capital has been considered by many, defined by some, and understood 
by a select few (Bontis, 1998). Stewart (1997) defined intellectual capital as a set 
of knowledge, information, intellectual property and expertise which can be used 
for the purpose of creating wealth. It is the aggregate sum of intangible assets 
which comprise both human and structural capital (Mouritsen, Larson and Bukh, 
2001). The concept of intellectual capital seems to stem from the discussion of 
goodwill and the difference between book value and purchase value (Lynn, 1998). 
The generally accepted accounting principles perceive intellectual capital as the 
value of firm’s intangible assets that are not reflected on the balance sheet.  
A variety of approaches have been advanced to measure and report intellectual 
capital. Edvinsson and Sullivan (1996) proposed three components of IC- human 
capital, structural capital (patents, copyrights, etc) and relational capital (customer 
relations). Bontis (2001) identified Skandia, as the first company to measure its 
knowledge assets in 1994. Skandia’s IC report consists of human and structural 
capital involving 112 metrics to measure five areas of focus (financial, customer, 
process, renewal and development, and human capital) which it called the 
‘Navigator’ model. Another approach to measure IC was Guthrie and Petty’s 
(2000) content analysis which entailed coding information contained in annual 
reports in line with established framework of intellectual capital indicators. This 
study would employ a similar approach to Guthrie and Petty’s content analysis and 
examine the extent to which board dynamics impact on these disclosure indices. 
Various studies of investors’ and analysts’ requests for information indicate a 
substantial difference between the type of information found in companies’ annual 
reports and the type of information demanded by the market (Eccles et al, 2001; 
Eccles and Mavrinac, 1995). As such, Bukh (2002) argues that companies, 
investors and analysts request more reliable information, for example, managerial 
qualities, expertise, experience and integrity, customer relations and personnel 
competencies- all ingredients of intellectual capital. Professionals and scholars all 
over the world have manifested their concern regarding this practice of disclosing 
knowledge assets arguing that the accounting system will lose its relevance should 
accounting regulations fail to adjust to the increasing need of supplying pertinent 
information on intellectual capital investment (Johnson and Kaplan, 1987) 
.Stolowy  and Jeny- Cazavan (2001) discovered that most regulations stipulate a 
general conceptual definition for intellectual capital and then include a list of 
intangible items.  
The Nigerian Statement of Accounting Standard (SAS) number 22 on intangible 
assets released in 2006 marked the beginning of intellectual capital recognition in 
Nigeria. The recent compliance with the International Financial Reporting Standard 
and International Accounting Standards also brings the issue of IC disclosures to 
the table for further consideration. The International Accounting Standard (IAS 38) 
specifies that an entity can identify an asset if future benefits are attributable to 
assets being directed to the entity and if the costs are credibly assessable. The 
introduction of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS 3), a regulation 
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demanding the identification and valuation of intangible assets in business 
combinations, may be considered as the opportunity for a practical application of 
the methods and tools proposed by the intellectual capital community. Such 
opportunity entails making intangible assets such as knowhow, customer capital, 
structural capital, etc, visible in the financial statement. IFRS 3 is an opportunity to 
test the relevance of IC models and reduce the gap between IC Accounting and 
Financial Accounting (Petty and Guthrie, 2000; Roslender and Fincham, 2001).  
Tayib and Salman (2011) demonstrate that as a company discloses its intellectual 
resource, the better it becomes competitive and also maintains the confidentiality of 
its investors and creditors. Okwy and Christopher (2010) argue in their study that 
millions of Naira is lost for non-disclosure of certain intellectual capital indicators. 
This goes to emphasize the critical nature of intellectual capital disclosures. 
However sound financial reporting (especially voluntary) can scarcely be realized 
without sound corporate governance mechanisms in place. Many corporate 
governance mechanisms in common practice have been applied to minimize 
information irregularity and asymmetry (Azman and Kamaluddin, 2012). 
Corporate Governance has been a standing issue in the disclosure of more 
voluntary information which is necessary in enhancing the company’s value and 
attracting investors. Clemente and Libet (2009) and Akhtaruddin et al (2009) 
argued that effective corporate governance mechanisms have impacts on efficient 
intellectual capital management, including the disclosure of information to 
stakeholders. This would in the view of Kavida and Sivakoumar (2008), get 
stakeholders informed about the core strengths of the company and then thus 
promote transparency. This study is then geared at ascertaining the extent to which 
various corporate governance mechanisms of Nigeria listed firms influence 
intellectual capital disclosure. 
 
2 Underlying Theory 
The Agency theory provides the connection between voluntary disclosures to 
practices to corporate Governance where such governance mechanism is employed 
as a control to reduce the agency problem arising from the separation between 
ownership and management (Welker, 1995). The Agency problem exists when the 
principal and agent have different interests. The self interest of the management 
(agent) can compromise the best interest of investors (Fama and Jensen, 1983). As 
such governance mechanisms in practice have been applied to minimize 
information irregularity and asymmetry. Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency 
theory provide a framework for linking disclosure behavior to corporate 
governance by considering both as drivers/ mechanisms of accountability. Sound 
governance mechanisms reduces the possibility that management will try to further 
their interests by using information irregularities and asymmetry .Such mechanisms 
could also trigger managers to disclose more information. This study is thus 
anchored on the agency theory to examine the possible link between intellectual 
capital disclosures and board mechanisms. 
 
Prior Research and Hypotheses Development 
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Intellectual Capital has become a key for gaining competitive advantage in a 
business environment that transcends fixed geographic boundaries (Lev, 2004). 
The Agency theory adopted in this study argues that the board is an intermediary 
between management and stakeholders and is poised at reducing agency problems 
of which information asymmetry and irregularity is dominant. The more voluntary 
information is disclosed, the easier it is for investors to minimize ambiguity and 
then take calculated decisions. Intellectual Capital information is essential for 
stakeholder in order for them to make better decisions (Li et al; 2008). Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) further demonstrate that in the agency context, the more 
intellectual capital disclosures is disclosed, less ambiguity is encountered by 
investors and this indirectly minimizes a firm’s cost of capital.  
The possible prediction of the extent of IC information by board mechanisms is a 
topic of discussion fast gaining momentum. Several empirical studies on IC 
disclosures and governance have either been cross sectional (Guthrie and Petty, 
2000; Bozzolan et al, 2003; Goh and Lim, 2004) or longitudinal (Abeysekera and 
Guthrie, 2005; Oliveras et al; 2008; 2008; Campbell and Rehman, 2010). Bozzolan 
et al (2003) conducted a competitive analysis between ‘traditional’ companies and 
‘high tech’ companies whereby the results showed variations in the IC disclosure in 
annual reports of high profile and low profile industries. They found that high 
profile industries disclose more information than low profile industries. Cerbioni 
and Parbonetti (2007) examined the effects of corporate governance on intellectual 
capital disclosure, analyzing bio- technology companies in Europe. They observed 
a positive correlation between corporate governance features and intellectual 
capital disclosure. Nadi (2004) examined the relation between board structure and 
intellectual capital in the case study of pharmacology companies in Tehran 
Security Exchange and concluded a significant and positive relation between 
intellectual capital and board characteristics. Keenan and Aggestan (2001) and Li 
et al (2008), demonstrate that sound governance structures significantly impact 
intellectual capital disclosures .Angaye et al (2010) investigates the link between 
corporate board features and value added intellectual capital. They find no 
statistical significant associations between the board features and intellectual 
performance disclosures. This study examines the influence certain board 
mechanisms have on intellectual capital information disclosure in Nigerian firms. 
As such, the following mechanisms are investigated.  
Board Size 
The size of the board of directors has been identified as a factor influences the level 
of intellectual capital disclosure since information disclosure is a strategic decision 
usually made by the company’s board. Larger boards allow firms to bring critical 
and diverse resources and experiences onto the board that can make the board’s 
decision making effective directly or indirectly (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Parum, 
2005). However, a big board size is difficult to coordinate. A small board on the 
other hand, is a favorable field to coordination, but, it can suffer from a lack of 
experience and competence of its members. The issue of a having an optimal size 
is a problem for the firm. Arcay and Vazquez (2005) argue that the board size has 
no impact on voluntary disclosures. This study supposes the existence of a neutral 
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relationship between the size and intellectual capital disclosure. Thus, the 
following hypothesis: 
H1: Board size has no significant impact on the quality of Intellectual capital 
disclosures in Nigerian firms. 
Board Independence 
In line with the agency theory, the presence of non-executive directors in the board 
as independent individuals reduces the conflict of interests existing between 
shareholders and directors of the firm (Khodadadi et al (2010). Chen and Jaggi 
(2002) found a positive relationship between a board with higher proportion of 
independent directors and comprehensive financial disclosure. This finding is 
consistent with the agency theory that demonstrates that a higher proportion of 
independent directors enhance voluntary financial reporting (Barako et al; 2006). 
Aktaruddin et al (2009) and Obeua (2009) find that firms can expect more 
voluntary disclosure with the inclusion of a larger number of independent non-
executive directors on the board. Likewise, Cheng and Courtenay (2006) find that 
boards with a larger proportion of independent directors are positively and 
significantly associated with higher levels of voluntary disclosure. In the light of 
the above, the following is hypothesized:- 
H2: Board Independence has a positive significant impact on Intellectual capital 
disclosure quality in Nigerian firms. 
Audit Committee Independence 
An important role played by audit committees is to ensure the quality of 
information disclosure and corporate accountability (Azman and Kamaluddin, 
2012). Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) provide that an audit committee composed 
of a majority of independent directors can enhance the quality of information 
disclosure to allow for a more accurate assessment of top management decisions 
and performance. Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) studied a sample of 275 fortune 
500 firms from 1995 to 2000 to determine how corporate boards and audit 
committees are associated with voluntary disclosure practices. Their findings are 
consistent with the proposition that effective audit committees are associated with 
higher disclosure quality. Summarily, independent directors on the audit committee 
could enhance the amount and quality of voluntary disclosure by enhancing 
decision control process and thus making control over top management more 
effective (Menon and Williams, 1994). In this light, the following is hypothesized: 
H3: There is a positive significant impact of audit committee independence on the 
quality of Intellectual Capital disclosure in Nigerian firms. 
Board Gender Diversity 
The issue of having women on boards of directors is a topic that is recently 
engendering interest in various quarters with majority of studies showing the 
positive effects of gender diversity on corporate boards. Companies with high 
female representation on their board tend to have stronger corporate governance 
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than those with few or no women on the board of directors (Rosener, 2003) and 
consider the needs of a wider range of stakeholders than male directors (Konrad 
and Kramer, 2006). Fodio and Oba (2012) document that the presence of female 
directors on a board has a significant impact on its environmental information 
disclosure. This study hypothesizes that:-  
H4: Gender diversity has a significant positive impact on the quality of intellectual 
capital disclosure in Nigerian firms. 
Board Nationality Diversity 
Extant literature offers an existing relationship between board demographic 
diversity and decision making (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Bilimoria and Wheeler, 
2000). A more diverse board may be more creative and innovative. Sanda et al 
(2005) found that firms with foreign CEOs tend to perform better than those with 
indigenous CEOs. Oba et al (2012) also demonstrate that foreign directors play a 
significant role in enhancing the quality of environmental information disclosed in 
annual reports. This study hypothesizes that:  
H5: Foreign directors have a significant positive impact on the quality of 
intellectual capital disclosures in Nigerian firms. 
Control variable 
This study utilizes an explanatory variable (firm size) as moderator of the potential 
relationship between board mechanisms and intellectual capital disclosures. 
Williams (2000) argued that specific corporate characteristics may influence the 
level of intellectual capital disclosure practices. Bozzolan et al (2003) identified 
size as a significant factor with a tangible effect on reported IC disclosure using 
Italian data. For large firms which deal with more public scrutiny, visibility, and 
accessibility, voluntary disclosures can be seen as a source of reduction in 
information asymmetry and irregularity. This study thus hypothesizes that: 
H6: Firm size has a positive significant effect on extent of intellectual capital 
disclosures. 
 
Research Design 
The firms selected in the sample are the twenty Nigerian companies that made the 
Forbes Africa top 25 companies (2012) in West Africa. The Forbes award was 
ranked in terms of market capitalization, revenue and profit of the firms. These 
companies were characterized by Forbes Africa as successful risk takers and job 
creators that have sustained excellence. This is expected in line with extant IC 
literature that these companies must have exhibited a high level of knowledge 
assets utilization. As such they form the sample. However, the following filters 
were observed: 
1) Banks were not included in the study firms due to the special regulatory 
environment in which they operate. 
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2) Firms that were not listed or were delisted during the study period (2006-
2009) were excluded from the sample.  
A sample of 10 companies made the final sample list. The list is found in 
Appendix 1. Annual reports of the firms were used as the source of raw data 
for this study. Annual reports are the chief external reporting vehicle used for 
communicating IC information (Sujan and Abeysekera, 2007). More so, they 
offer an opportunity for a comparative analysis of management attributes and 
policies across reporting periods (Guthrie et al, 2004). 
 
Measurement of Variables 
Dependent Variable (Intellectual Capital Disclosure Quality) 
Intellectual Capital disclosure quality is measured as a dummy variable. The study 
uses the content analysis approach to develop an IC disclosure index. The 
developed IC Disclosure framework is found in Appendix 2. Content analysis has 
been successfully applied to investigate voluntary reporting in IC. The method 
provides useful guidelines and content categories to IC in examining disclosure 
patterns. A dichotomous non weighted approach was employed. As such a value of 
one was assigned when an attribute appears in the report while a value of zero was 
used to indicate that the attribute did not appear in the annual report. A company 
could score a maximum of the 22 tested IC attributes and minimum of zero points. 
Companies that score over 50% of the total attributes are labeled to have disclosed 
quality intellectual capital disclosures and are assigned 1; on the other hand, those 
with less than 50% of the scores are assigned 0. 
Independent Variables 
1) Board Size – This is measured as the absolute number of board members. 
2) Board Independence – This is measured as the absolute value of the 
number of independent directors in the board. 
3) Audit Committee Independence – Audit Committee Independence is 
captured as the number of independent directors in the audit committee. 
4) Board Gender Diversity – The variable is measured as the proportion of 
women directors in the board to the total number of directors. 
5) Board Nationality Diversity – This is captured as the number of foreign 
directors in the board. 
Control Variable 
Firm Size is measured as the natural logarithm of the total sales of the 
study firms. 
 
Data Analysis Technique 
A logistic regression is used to test the relationship between the dependent variable 
and regressors. This method is considered appropriate for this analysis since the 
dependent variable is a dummy variable (Gujarati and Porter, 2009).  
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Model Specification 
The following logistic regression model is used to test the research propositions of 
the study:- 
Log (P/1-P) = b0 +b1BS +b2BIND +b3ACI +b4BGD +b5BND +b6FS +eit………. 
(1) 
Where P = Probabilities that companies disclose quality Intellectual Capital 
Information 
          1-P = Probabilities that companies do not disclose quality Intellectual Capital 
Information 
            BS = Board Size 
       BIND = Board Independence 
       ACI = Audit Committee Independence 
      BGD = Board Gender Diversity 
      BND = Board Nationality Diversity 
      FS = Firm Size 
 
4 Results and Discussion 
Table 1  Classification Tablea,b 
 
Observed 
Predicted 
 ICDQ Percentage 
Correct  .00 1.00 
Step 0 ICDQ .00 32 0 100.0 
1.00 18 0 .0 
Overall Percentage   64.0 
a. Constant is included in the model. 
b. The cut value is .500 
 
Table 2   Classification Tablea 
 
Observed 
Predicted 
 ICDQ Percentage 
Correct  .00 1.00 
Step 1 ICDQ .00 27 5 84.4 
1.00 7 11 61.1 
Overall Percentage   76.0 
a. The cut value is .500 
J o u r n a l  o f  A c c o u n t i n g  a n d  M a n a g e m e n t                      J A M  v o l .  3 ,  n o .  1 ( 2 0 1 3 )  
 
73 
 
 
 
 
Table 3   Variables not in the Equation 
   Score Df Sig. 
Step 0 Variables BS 4.152 1 .045 
BIND .444 1 .505 
BGD .904 1 .342 
BND 4.715 1 .039 
ACI .000 1 .987 
FS 7.941 1 .005 
Overall Statistics 14.337 6 .026 
 
Table 4    Model Summary 
Step 
-2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox & Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
1 31.655a .375 .523 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because 
parameter estimates changed by less than .001. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5    Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
  Chi-square Df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 18.792 6 .005 
Block 18.792 6 .005 
Model 18.792 6 .005 
 
Table 6    Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square Df Sig. 
1 5.057 8 .751 
 
 
 
Table 7     Variables in the Equation 
  B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a BS -1.386 .600 5.377 1 .021 4.000 
BIND .317 .319 .988 1 .320 1.373 
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BGD .386 .316 .336 1 .521 1.080 
BND 1.132 .895 5.001 1 .024 6.841 
ACI -.717 .900 .635 1 .425 .488 
FS 5.546 2.266 5.987 1 .014 .004 
Constant 41.822 16.044 6.795 1 .009 1.455E18 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: BS, BIND, BGD, BND, ACI, and FS. 
 
The classification table (Table 1) suggests that if nothing is known about the 
variables and if one should guess that the companies did not disclose quality 
intellectual capital disclosures, one would be correct 64% of the time. The 
variables not in the equation in table 3 reveals the magnitude to which explanatory 
variable improves the model. Board size, board nationality diversity and firm size 
are significant and if included would add predictive ability to the model. An 
inclusion of these predictors changes the classification error rate from the original 
64%. By adding these variables, one can now predict changes in the regressand 
with 76% accuracy (Table 2). The model is certainly sound. To test the overall 
significance, the model chi square derived from the likelihood of observing the 
actual data is utilized. The model chi square is simply the difference between -2 log 
likelihood for the null hypothesis model. The -2 log likelihood from the model 
summary in table 4 is 31.655. In this study, model chi square has 6 degrees of 
freedom, a value of 18.792 and a probability of P≤ .005 (Table 5). Thus indicating 
that the predictors have a significant and a tangible effect. The Cox and Snell R 
Square in table 4 indicate that 37.5% of the changes in intellectual capital 
disclosure quality are explained by the logistic model. The Nagelkerke R2 ranges 
from 0 to 1 and is a reliable measure of the relationship (Menard, 2002). Its R2 is 
usually higher than the Cox and Snell measure. In this study, it is 0.523, indicating 
a moderate relationship of 52.35 between the regressors and the regressand.  
The Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness of fit statistic assesses the fitness of the 
model. Where it exceeds 0.05, as is desired for well fitting models, one fails to 
reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the observed and 
predicted values, indicating that the model’s estimates fit the data at an acceptable 
level. According to Pampel (2000), well fitting models show non significance on 
the Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness of fit test. The statistic in this study (table 6) 
has a significance of 0.751 which means that it is not significantly different and 
therefore the model is a good fit. The Wald statistics in table 7 show that board 
independence, board gender diversity and audit committee independence do not 
make a significant contribution to the prediction of quality intellectual capital 
disclosures. Scholars have previously emphasized that these governance dynamics 
are significantly associated with higher levels of voluntary disclosure. (Obeua, 
2009; Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007; Fodio and Oba, 2012). The findings of this 
study contradict these arguments. With respect to the board size, board nationality 
diversity and firm size variables; the Wald statistics show significant impact on the 
dependent variable. However, a significant negative relationship is documented 
between board size and intellectual capital disclosure quality. A possible 
explanation could be due to the ‘too many cooks syndrome’; being that big boards 
could be difficult to coordinate. This finding is consistent with the work of 
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Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) who demonstrate that the board size has a negative 
effect on total intellectual capital disclosure index. When the size of the board is 
small, monitoring quality will be better (Yermack, 1996) because the agency 
problem will increase with the size of the board (Conger et al; 1998).  
Also the Wald statistics reveal a positive significant impact of the board nationality 
diversity on the disclosure quality. This is possibly due to the fact that foreign 
directors bring along diverse creativity, innovativeness and experience to the table. 
More so Intellectual capital disclosure is still at the embryonic stage in emerging 
economies; as such, foreign experience with a broad understanding of such 
voluntary reporting brings a lot to bear. This study shows firm size similarly has a 
significant influence on the quantity of intellectual capital disclosure. A possible 
explanation is that big companies are more visible and are expected to meet 
investors demand for information compared with small companies (Li et al; 2008). 
Based on this, it can be implied that the greater the firm size, the higher the quality 
of intellectual capital disclosure. This finding lends support to the works of 
Bozzolan et al (2003); and Guthrie, Petty and Riceri (2006) who demonstrate that 
size has a significant effect on IC disclosure. It however contrasts the study of 
Bontis (2003) that shows insignificance. 
 
5 Conclusion and Recommendations 
Intellectual capital (IC) has become a key for gaining advantage in a business 
terrain that transcends fixed geographic borders. As the global economy shifts to 
the knowledge age, IC information becomes an essential factor underlying value 
creation; as such, its disclosure becomes an issue of paramount concern for 
transparency to stakeholders. This study investigates the influence of governance 
mechanisms on IC disclosure quality by top Nigerian firms in their annual reports. 
Board size, board independence, board gender diversity, board nationality 
diversity, audit committee independence, and a control variable (firm size) were 
considered. Based on the results, board independence, board gender diversity and 
audit committee independence show no significance in predicting IC disclosure 
quality. However, board size, board nationality diversity and firm size were found 
relevant in predicting IC disclosure quality. These variables have shown to be 
important contributors and determinants of IC disclosure quality and are 
recommended for an extended study on IC disclosure. The study thus recommends 
to firms that desire to have qualitative IC disclosure frameworks to incorporate 
experienced foreign directors (where local experienced ones are unavailable) and 
have manageable board sizes. Also, opportunities for future research are still 
extensive. A larger sample size could be investigated for more reliable results and 
generalizations, while other governance dynamics such as ownership 
concentration, institutional investors, number of board meetings and so forth could 
be incorporated for further investigations.Please read these instructions carefully. 
Prepare your paper and data exactly according to the instructions. Please present 
your results clearly in a logical sequence which supports the hypothesis/research 
target. 
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Appendix 1 
Sample Companies 
1. Lafarge Cement WAPCO 
2. Total Nigeria Limited 
3. Unilever Nigeria 
4. PZ Cuzzons Nigeria Ltd 
5. UACN 
6. Cadbury 
7. Nigeria Breweries 
8. Flour Mills Nigeria Plc 
9. Guinness Nigeria Plc 
10. Nestle Nigeria Plc 
Appendix 2 
Intellectual Capital Disclosure Framework 
 A.  Human Capital 
1. Numbers of Employee 
2. Employee Equity/ Equal opportunities 
3. Training 
4. Staff Health and Safety 
5. Employee welfare 
6. Compensation Plan/ bonus 
7. Career Development 
8. Employees Knowhow/ Education level 
9. Employee Remuneration 
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10. Human Resource Policy/Human Resource Department 
B. Structural Capital 
11. Intellectual Properties- Patents, copyrights and Trademarks 
12.  Research and Development 
13. New Product Line 
14. New Technology 
15. Information Technology/ Information Systems, Software Development/ Networking 
Systems. 
C. Relational Capital 
16. Market Share 
17. Business Partnering- Franchising, Suppliers, Government, Licensing Agreement, Joint 
Venture. 
18. Supply Chain/Distribution Networks. 
19. Promotion Strategies/ Competitive Intelligence. 
20. Corporate Image- Social Responsibilities, Environmental Management/ Protection, 
Statement of Image and Corporate Culture 
21. Brands- Range of Products and Services 
22. Product Awards 
 
